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Contributions of Commissions of Inquiry
to Policy Analysis: An Evaluation
Peter Aucoin*
1.

INTRODUCTION

Commissions of inquiry appointed to analyze major matters of public
policy constitute an important organizational instrument in governance for
essentially three reasons. First, their establishment enables decision-makers in
government to delay or postpone decisions without being criticized for doing
nothing at all. Policy analysis in this circumstance may be an excuse for a
"non-decision", but at the least it ensures that the issue at hand stays on the
policy agenda in a certain fashion. Second, such commissions provide for a
process whereby the views of special interest groups and the interested public
can be presented in a forum that is not subject to direct government control.
This can include the capacity to actively solicit views from various quarters
and direct support for the participation of particular interests. Third, and
perhaps most relevant, commissions of inquiry of this sort represent the most
effective option available to government for policy analysis undertaken by an
independent and objective, and yet official, organization. Commissions are
the most effective option in this regard because they have a greater capacity to

*

Professor, Department of Political Science and School of Public Administration, Dalhousie
University.

198

COMMISSIONS OF INQUIRY

be, and to be seen to be, independent and objective than other governmental
instruments of public policy analysis.'
Each of these characteristics is important to policy analysis as an activity
of governance. The first provides time for analysis as an intellectual exercise;
the second provides the opportunity to examine and assess demands and support for various policy options; and the third provides for analysts who are
able to evaluate policy options free from the constraints of partisan controls or
institutional limitations extant in other governmental organizations which
conduct policy analyses. These characteristics, individually or collectively,
do not ensure "good" policy analysis. They are a necessary but not a sufficient
condition for quality. Moreover, as conditions, they are not always met in the
establishment and operation of particular commissions. Taken together, they
constitute an ideal. As a general rule, nonetheless, these conditions are more
likely to be met in commissions of inquiry than in other kinds of institutionalized policy analysis within the public sector. It is for this reason that they
continue to be used with considerable frequency notwithstanding the fact that
governments' capacities for policy analysis have been increased substantially
in recent decades.
2.

POLICY ANALYSIS AS APPLIED SOCIAL SCIENCE

As institutions for policy analysis, commissions of inquiry engage in
applied social science. What they do in this respect is no different from what
is done in other institutions where policy analysis is conducted. Problems (or
possibilities) are defined, alternatives are developed and assessed in terms of
costs and benefits, priorities are established; feasibility is considered in relation to demands and support, options are evaluated and recommendations are
made. The recommendations of commissions are made public, in contrast to
much, indeed most, of the policy advice offered within government; and the
reports, as well as the studies, of commissions provide the policy analyses on
which such recommendations are based. It is this feature of commissions,
albeit one not entirely unique to such commissions, that naturally invites an
evaluation of their contribution to policy analysis.
Students of public policy have not ignored the role of commissions in the
policy process. Indeed, commissions often are deemed to be key factors in
this process precisely because their policy analyses have clarified policy
issues, drawn explicit reference to the specific interests involved in a policy
sector, contributed to our understanding of the various public interests at stake
in complex policy subjects, introduced or legitimized innovative ideas and
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pointed to novel ways by which to overcome what previously had been regarded
as intractable policy dilemmas.2 At least on the basis of the literature in political science and public administrition, one could in fact come to the conclusion that the policy analyses of commissions are generally held in high
regard.3 At the same time, however, it must be pointed out that there exists no
systematic evaluation of the contributions of commissions' policy analyses to
policy analysis. Although perhaps possible in principle, such as by way of the
Delphi technique in which panels of specialists in the policy areas of commissions' analyses would evaluate the same, it is unlikely that an evaluation of
this sort would ever by undertaken. Aside from the questions of costs and
logistics, there are two reasons to doubt the value of any such undertaking.
First, by its very nature policy analysis is an intellectual exercise. As an
activity it does involve a standard set of activities that should be undertaken.
In terms of process and techniques, there are objective norms that can be
agreed upon. But insofar as policy analysis, even as an intellectual exercise,
involves "judgment" in weighing costs and benefits in regard to the public
interest, for example, it is ultimately a subjective exericse' Second, policy
analysis, as applied social science, is an activity that also involves
"creativity", in the development of policy options, for example. In this
respect there are no objective standards to assess policy analysis after the fact.
One cannot measure creativity. It is for both of these reasons that policy
analysts who evaluate the work of other policy analysts must ultimately do so
by reference to the degree to which the work of the latter conforms to their
own schools of thought or applied social science "paradigms": paradigms
which cannot pretend to be "objective" in the sense that all subjective values
have been eliminated. 5 One need go no further than an examination of the
responses of academic and professional economists to the Macdonald Royal
Commission's policy analysis concerning the role of the state in the Canadian
economy to find evidence of this reality.6
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3.

COMMISSIONS AS INSTITUTIONALIZED POLICY ANALYSIS

If it follows that an evaluation of the contributions of commissions to
policy analysis is inherently limited by the above considerations, then what
accounts for the perception that such commissions are an ideal institutional
mechanism for independent and objective policy analysis? Or, put another
way, why is there the assumption that such commissions have contributed and
can contribute to policy analysis? The answers to these questions, I suggest,
lie in the fact that policy analysis is not only an intellectual exercise of applied
social science, it is also a social (or perhaps better said, a political) activity.
As such, the institutional context and its organizing mechanisms are equally
critical to its undertaking. In much the same way that science in general is
organized in certain ways to ensure, or at least promote, independence and
objectivity, the applied social science that is policy analysis must be so
organized. Such organization does not in itself produce good policy analysis,
to be certain, but all things being equal there are good and not so good ways to
organize the policy analysis function in governance if independence and
objectivity are desired."
From this perspective there is the recognition, perhaps an increasing
recognition, that commissions of inquiry are well suited as institutional
mechanisms for policy analysis if the following conditions are met:
multi-member commissions rather than single member commissions;
- multi-disciplinary staff;
- a mixture of experienced administrators and outside expertise;
- a public hearings process;
- a diffused and decentralized operational system for research, discussion and deliberation; and
- public dissemination of studies as well as report.
Each of these conditions is important. The first recognizes that policy
analysis is a socio-political process wherein judgment is not simply the application of professional criteria to a given case but rather an interactive activity:
simply put, two or more heads are better than one, even where this leads to
dissenting opinions, an outcome that invariably enriches policy analysis per
se notwithstanding the dilemma that then confronts policy-makers. Multimember commissions also obviously enable governments to secure representation from a broader range of perspectives than is the case with single member
commissions. Although this also allows for the representation of vested
interests on commissions, it does not necessarily follow that this undermines
their value.
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The second condition constitutes, in a sense, a subsidiary of the first,
namely the need to secure staff who are not confined to one disciplinary
perspective. This requirement pertains even in areas where the subject matter,
as substantive policy, has become the preserve of a single discipline (or
profession such as law, accounting or engineering). This requirement, however, constitutes an increasing difficult challenge to fulfill, especially in terms
of the actual interaction of staff even when staffing from more than one
discipline occurs. The Macdonald Commission is again a good example of
this difficulty: at least three disciplines (law, economics and political science)
were engaged but interaction between specialists from them was at best
minimal. 8 This is not, of course, a problem unique to commissions but their
ad hoc and temporary character exacerbates it for there is precious little time
to develop an interdisciplinary approach to analysis.
The third condition - a mixture of experienced administrators and outside expertise - is required in order to have knowledge related to policy
implementation brought to bear upon the consideration of policy options, on
the one hand, and an independence from the prevailing policy orientation and
approach, on the other. It is my impression, based upon information from
persons involved in a number of commissions, that this condition is one
increasingly acknowledged as important, in part, as a result of the-lessons
learned from the use of executive task forces (a close cousin of commissions). 9 Secondment of government officials is the most obvious manner by
which this condition is met, given that the use of outside experts has almost
always been the norm for commissions in any event.
The fourth condition, public hearings, is one usually associated with
commissions of inquiry given their public character. Indeed, such commissions have been at the forefront in the development of public participation
methods, especially those designed to ensure the participation of interests
which, for reasons of organization or resources, are often not well represented
in the regular or on-going governmental processes of policy development and
debate. Given the increasing use of regularized consultative processes, especially between the administrative apparatus of government and institutionalized pressure groups with the initiative for the same, coming as much from
the former as the latter, the requirement that commissions actively seek out the
broadest possible range of interested and affected parties constitutes an essential condition for commissions providing policy analyses that contain added
value to those done within the regular structures of government.
A diffused and decentralized operational system for research, discussion
and deliberation is a fifth condition because of the essentially intellectual
activity that is policy analysis. At some point, perhaps with a deadline,
8
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commissioners must decide what they will recommend. At the same time, in
the process leading to decisions, the organization and management of policy
analysis (including research, discussion and deliberation) should not ignore
the need for some autonomy and discretion in the work of analysts (including
researchers) and as well a communications system that cuts across any hierarchical arrangements put in place for administrative requirements. In particular, commissioners and staff, especially the former, must recognize that
informed analysis and logical argument need to take precedence over formal
authority in the interaction among commissioners and staff. Knowledge may
not be power but the commission form of policy analysis demands that power
not be substituted for knowledge.
Finally, the very essence of a commission of inquiry as an exercise in
policy analysis requires that there be a public dissemination of its studies as
well as its report. This requirement does not emanate so much from the
demand for access to government documents or freedom of information per
se; the policy recommendations of a commission are not public policy. Rather,
to the degree that such commissions are used for policy analysis purposes the
logic of the mandate demands that any such contributions be considered
"public knowledge" - an essential requirement of all science."0 Only in this
way can the contributions of commissions to policy analysis be evaluated.
This requirement is not made any less important by the argument presented
previously to the effect that "objective" evaluation is not something that can
be accomplished. Rather, the requirement for evaluation proceeds from the
need to assess the premises, assumptions, models, data and techniques
present and deployed in the intellectual exercise of a commission. The fact
that evaluation of the same will themselves be based upon certain values as
contained in particular schools of thought or paradigms does not diminish the
significance of this requirement. The political system, and especially the
specific policy audiences in question, can "learn" only insofar as policy
analyses fulfill the conditions of "public knowledge"."
4.

INSTITUTIONAL OPTIONS FOR POLICY ANALYSIS

These characteristics describe an ideal type of commission. Not every
commission measures up to this ideal, either in design or practice or both. As
the characteristics of a particular institutional arrangement for policy analysis,
commissions do have advantages over other institutional arrangements.
Governments, as governing parties, have used commissions because of the
10
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paucity of policy analyses undertaken by political parties in Canada, at least
with respect to the two parties which have formed the governing party at the
national level in Canada. But even more important, in the most recent past,
that is after the development of a much greater capacity by governments
themselves to conduct policy analyses in central agencies, departments,
executives task forces, and public advisory bodies (the Economic Council of
Canada, the Science Council of Canada, and the Law Reform Commission of
Canada, to name three major examples), governments have continued to use
commissions of inquiry for policy analysis purposes.12 Not even the development of a strengthened and more proactive system of parliamentary
committees has served to abate the use of commissions. 3 The reasons for the
continued use of commissions do not stem from a lack of technical capacities
on the part of these alternate institutional arrangements for policy analysis.
Rather, none of them is able to be, or at least to be seen to be, as independent
and objective as a commission. This is not to dispute the usefulness of these
other institutions but only to note their more limited utility to a government
under certain conditions, that is, when a public perception of independence
and objectivity is deemed to be of the highest priority.
Policy analysis conducted within government by central agencies,
departments and internal task forces is almost by definition deficient by the
standards of applied social science for the obvious reason that it is not the
norm for such analyses to become, in their entirety, public knowledge (even
under liberalized access to government document regimes). This very fact
may be viewed as an advantage in terms of their capacity to meet the political
or administrative criterion of "feasibility". What is considered to be feasible,
however, may be nothing more than a rationalization or justification for
predetermined policy decisions. In an attempt to offset this cynical interpretation, some policy analyses conducted within and by government central
agencies, departments and especially task forces do conform to the criterion
of public knowledge in the form of published "coloured papers" or reports.
They may even involve consultative processes with affected interests and the
participation of outsiders. In these ways, these exercises, albeit few in
number, do emulate some characteristics of commissions. The retention of
executive control over them, especially, but not only, discretion over the
publication of their analyses, limits their claim to independence and objectivity, whatever their intrinsic merits.
The establishment of what have been described as public or "external"
advisory councils, such as the Economic Council of Canada, the Science
Council of Canada and the Law Reform Commission of Canada, challenged
12
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the dominance of commissions of enquiry precisely because they were intended to be an alternative to the temporary, ad hoc commission of inquiry as an
institution for policy analysis. They were viewed as a way to "decommission"'14 the external policy analysis function and to create "a permanent body of expertise related to recurring social and economic problems"."5
As Phidd noted in regard to the Economic Council:
[1]t was an attempt to institutionalize on a continuing basis the work of royal
commissions, one of the main methods by which fundamental economic
research was done previously in Canada. More specifically, it was an attempt to
carry on the work of the Gordon Commission on Canada's long-term economic
prospects. ... Dr. John Deutsch, the council's first chairman, in several
speeches described certain aspects of the council's work as being consistent with
the work of royal commissions. Furthermore, the council's composition was
similar to royal commissions in the sense that it drew expertise from outside of
the regular bureaucratic strucrure. 6
The continued use of commissions of the temporary, ad hoc variety, even
in policy fields covered by these external advisory councils (the Macdonald
Commission being only one example in the policy domain of the Economic
Council), demonstrates the viability of such commissions. In the case of the
Economic Council and the Law Reform Commission, single disciplines have
dominated and in so doing have restricted their capacity for policy analysis. In
the case of the Science Council, and perhaps the Economic Council as well,
they have been regarded as institutions dominated by a prevailing paradigm or
school of thought - another limitation from the perspective of objective
policy analysis. Finally, the very fact that they are on-going institutions has
raised doubts about their independence, not from government but from their
own institutional perspective. Some or all of these implied limitations may not
be accurate or fair but from the vantage point of a government seeking to
promote the perception of an independent and objective exercise of policy
analysis on a particular topic this is beside the point.
The use of parliamentary committees (or task forces) for the purposes of
policy analysis as an alternative to commissions is even more problematic. On
the one hand, they may be viewed as little more than exercises subject to the
constraints of party discipline and thus partisan at the core. On the other hand,
when there is a semblance of parisan "neutrality", as is sometimes the case

14
15
16

J.E. Hodgetts, "Should Canada be De-Commissioned?" (1964) LXX Queen's Quarterly
475.
G. Bruce Doem, "The Role of Royal Commissions in the General Policy Process and in
Federal-Provincial Relations" (1967) X Canadian Public Administration 432.
R.W. Phidd, "The Role of Central Advisory Council: The Economic Council of Canada" in
Doer and Aucoin, supra, note 2 at 210.

CONTRIBUTIONS OF COMMISSIONS TO POLICY ANALYSIS

205

with House of Commons committees or perhaps even more so with Senate
committees, the subjects of inquiry are, with few exceptions, not central to
the current policy agenda of the government or political system. And in those
instances which are exceptions, the record of such committees is that they
have not given adequate attention to the interests or constituencies which are,
as Cairns puts it in defence of commissions, "insufficiently attended to by the
normal operations of government." 7 Although there is a case to be made for
greater reforms to our operation of parliamen*tary government, including the
role of parliamentary committees in this system of government, committees of
inquiry are a poor substitute for commissions of inquiry for the purposes of
policy analysis. For the greater part, members of Parliament, including
Senators, especially those who sit on such committees, lack the competence
to lead policy analyses. More importantly, the dynamic of our system of
parliamentary government as party government is that members of parliament
are not elected as representatives to undertake policy analyses as this activity
has been defined in this paper.
5.

LIMITATIONS OF COMMISSIONS

The fact that commissions of inquiry, as temporary, ad hoc institutions,
have advantages over the permanent institutional arrangements of our governmental system, including parliamentary committees, in terms of independence and objectivity does not mean that they necessarily always possess the
capacity to achieve independent and objective policy analysis of high quality.
There are at least four major factors that can serve to undermine the policy
analysis function of such commissions. These relate to the executive appointment of commissioners; the commission's appointment of staff; the limitations
of time for research; and, finally, the limitations which are inherent in temporary, ad hoc organizations.
The executive appointment of commissions by the Prime Minister and
cabinet presents an opportunity for partisan considerations to undermine
objective and independent policy analysis. At issue here is not so much the
partisan affiliations of commissioners, although this factor should not be
ignored, but rather the willingness of commissioners to undertake their
assignment in a manner that sets them apart from the partisan interests of the
governing party. A failure to do so makes such commissions little more than
executive task forces, a result that constitutes an "abuse" of the commission
form.
The commissioners' appointment of staff may introduce a second limitation in one of two ways. Such appointments may also be partisan, that is, with
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respect to the interests of the governing party, if commissioners themselves
are appointed with such interests as the major consideration. Or, even if
commissioners are non-partisan in this sense, staff may be appointed with a
policy bias, such as would be the case if only one school of thought is
represented.
A third factor that may militate against quality policy analysis is the
limitation of time for research. Original research is not always required for
policy analysis but when some such research is required, the time for the same
is often found wanting. Increasingly, commissions are given deadlines and
this means that their approach must be as "consumers, not producers, of
intellectual capital". 8 In this respect, governments can abuse the commission
form by placing too tight a deadline on a commission. This is an especially
serious abuse if it is known in advance that serious research is required in
order to test or challenge the dominance of a prevailing school of thought in a
policy area.
Finally, there is an institutional limitation that confronts commissions as
temporary, ad hoc mechanisms. This limitation arises from the fact that each
commission faces a set of conditions that is in some way unique. If some
degree of "learning" is required, in order, for example, to ascertain the particular approach to take respecting public participation or research, commissions often find themselves scrambling to search out the experiences of other
commissions. Few, if any, governments have an institutionalized
"organizational memory" in place with respect to commissions, beyond legal
advice on matters of powers and formal procedures. Effective policy analysis
is easily undermined by the absence of this capacity; too often each exercise
begins de novo with relative novices in charge. The abuse by governments
here is one not of commission, but omission, that is, a failure to develop an
institutional capacity to retain the experiences of commissions and to transmit
what has been learned.
6.

CONCLUSION

The above limitations account in some measure for the increased deployment of other kinds of policy analysis institutions by governments. They are
not limitations that cannot be overcome, however. More importantly, as
noted, all other arrangements have their own limitations, particularly with
respect to independence and objectivity. The latter two factors are, I suggest,
of increased importance to the governance, broadly defined, of contemporary
political systems. The development of highly bureaucratized "policy communities", as Pross calls them, dominated by administrative officials and pressure
groups' representatives, has fostered a diffusion of power in regard to access
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to decision-makers of public policy in the several fields that now constitute
the agenda of government.' 9 This, in turn, has served to give an even greater
legitimacy to the prevailing paradigms or schools of thought in each of these
fields. At times, as Pross notes, this requires that these officials and representations seek support from parliament to gain public or political endorsement
for this legitimacy. But, parliaments (or their committees) are ill-suited to this
function, as I have argued: they rarely can provide other than partisan
endorsement. The current calls for parliamentary reform may be appropriate
for certain purposes. They are, however, a poor substitute, and thus a misplaced one, for increased independence and objectivity in policy analysis. The
continued use of commissions is thus not only likely but an approach to
governance that should be encouraged.
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